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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper reports on the development of specifications for an on-board mass monitoring 
(OBM) application for regulatory requirements in Australia. An earlier paper reported on 
feasibility study and pilot testing program prior to the specification development [1]. 
Learnings from the pilot were used to refine the testing process and a full scale testing 
program was conducted from July to October 2008. The results from the full scale test and 
evidentiary implications are presented in this report. The draft specification for an evidentiary 
on-board mass monitoring application is currently under development. 
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BACKGROUND 
 
This project is being undertaken by Transport Certification Australia Ltd. (TCA, 
www.tca.gov.au). TCA is funded by the Australian Commonwealth and State/Territory 
Governments to administer the Intelligent Access Program (IAP, www.iap.com.au). The IAP 
is a voluntary program which provides heavy vehicles with improved access to the Australian 
road networks in return for monitoring of compliance with specific access conditions.  
 
The IAP is currently at its first stage. It monitors the location, speed and access times of 
heavy vehicles. Mass information is also required as part of IAP access conditions, however, 
it is gathered via a self declaration process. On-board mass monitoring (OBM) aims to 
provide more reliable and accurate mass information as an aid to the current IAP. 
 
Prior to the commencement of the project, a feasibility study was carried out to assess the 
capability of commercial OBM systems [2] [3]. The study identified two major types of mass 
sensors commonly used in many OBM systems: air pressure transducers (APTs) and load 
cells. Deflection sensors are another type of mass sensor. These measure the load on the steer 
axle of a heavy vehicle via the deflection of that axle. The study also found that mass 
information could be obtained from other in-vehicle systems such as the electronic braking 
system (EBS), although EBS was not widely available on current Australian trucks/trailers. 
Further, the study noted the importance of proper installation, calibration, operation and 
maintenance procedures with respect to the accuracy of OBM systems. 
 
Subsequent to the feasibility study, a project plan was developed to identify three stages 
towards the development of draft specifications for an evidentiary OBM monitoring system 
[4]. They were: 
1. pilot testing program 
2. full scale testing program 
3. development of draft specifications. 
 
The first stage of this project was reported in an earlier paper [1]. For the two systems in the 
pilot tests, it was found that OBM accuracy of about 1% compared with a weighbridges was 
achievable for an axle group, provided that proper operational procedures were followed. 
Tests without proper operational procedures produced OBM errors larger than 1%. Dynamic 
tests were also carried out while the vehicles were in motion, and the data collected provided 
a view of the OBM system’s dynamic response to the movement of the vehicles [7]. 
 
The second stage of this project was completed in October 2008 [8], and the results are 
presented in this paper.  
 
The third stage of this project, the development of specifications, is currently underway and 
will be reported in the future. 
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FULL SCALE TESTING PROGRAM 
 
Refined testing process 
 
The final test plan was revised based on the learnings from the pilot, and the testing process 
was refined for the deployment of a full scale test. The full scale test was conducted with 
twelve OBM systems on seven vehicles across five Australian states. In every test, one OBM 
system was used as an in-vehicle reference system in addition to each system under test. Each 
system was tested at four loading levels: fully laden, 2/3 laden, 1/3 laden and tare to gauge 
linearity. For each loading level, OBM data were recorded for mass in a static state (static 
data) six times on level ground with brakes released and engine running, as well as 
dynamically (dynamic data) when the vehicle was in motion. Tamper tests were also 
designed to examine the response of the OBM systems to tamper events.  
 
Figure 1 shows seven vehicles from the full scale test and an additional two vehicles from the 
pilot test. The nine vehicles were from five different vehicle classes: two B-doubles1, three 
semi-trailer trucks, one rigid truck, two truck and dogs2, and one pocket road train3. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Test vehicles 
 
 
Static results 
 
Each test vehicle was fitted with multiple OBM systems, and the measurements were taken 
both on a per axle group basis as well as for the gross combination mass (GCM). 
Measurements were recorded from a weighbridge and from an on-board mass system 
                                                            
1 A B-double is a prime mover connected to two trailers using fifth wheels. 
2 A truck and dog is a rigid truck connected to a trailer using a cross bar and a dolly. 
3 A pocket road train is semi-trailer truck connected to a trailer using a fifth wheel. 
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common to all tested HVs.  These data were used for the reference mass values in the HV and 
externally, respectively. 
 
Figure 2 shows the error distribution of axle group measurements from all twelve OBM 
systems against the weighbridges [5]. The distribution is based on 2175 samples. It can be 
seen that most of the errors fall between ± 500 kg.  
 
Figure 3 explicitly shows the errors of each OBM system for a tri-axle group for the fully 
laden condition (20 tonnes above). Again it can be seen that most of the systems produced 
accuracy within ± 500 kg of the weighbridge. This is equivalent to ± 2.5% or less. In fact, 
some systems achieved much higher accuracies to within ± 200 kg, or ± 1%. Some OBM 
systems generated errors which were not centred around 0 kg. These are recognised as 
functioning systems by the OBM industry because these errors are consistent within a small 
range.  Nonetheless, the observed offset could be adjusted by better calibration processes. 
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Figure 2: Error distribution by axle group [5] 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Errors by systems on fully laden tri-axle group [5] 
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Various tamper tests were designed to examine the vulnerability of the OBM systems. These 
tests included blocking the mass sensors, changing the fuel tank level of the vehicle, adjusting 
the ride height control valve, etc. Depending on the types and degrees of tampering, the effect 
on the tested OBM system accuracy varied from minor to significant. At the extreme, one of 
the tests resulted in the OBM system underestimating the mass by more than 25 tonnes. 
 
 
Dynamic results 
 
Dynamic testing was conducted while the test vehicles were moving on different roads with 
various speeds up to approximately 80 km/h. Dynamic OBM data was collected by the 
reference OBM system during these tests. The reference OBM system had a sampling 
frequency of 41.6 Hz. It produced both OBM data during static tests and dynamic 
(continuous) OBM data; both of these data sets in 30 second blocks.  Each 30 second block 
contained 1250 samples (41.6 Hz × 30 second). Figure 4 shows an example of typical 
dynamic OBM data. 
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Figure 4: Example of dynamic OBM data [5] 
 
While individual samples in a dynamic data block did not give any meaningful information 
regarding static HV mass, the average of many individual samples in fact provided a 
reasonably accurate indication of the mass of a vehicle.  
 
Figure 5 illustrates this observation by comparing the static OBM measurements and the 
average of the dynamic data against the weighbridge values. Both static measurements and 
the average of the dynamic data presented an almost one-to-one relationship with the 
weighbridge measurements. Further analysis showed that the 30 second averages of dynamic 
data were accurate to within ± 750 kg. Although this was less accurate compared with static 
measurements taken with proper operational procedures (i.e. on level ground, with brakes 
released and engine running), dynamic data averages did not require any of these procedures. 
Indeed, dynamic data was collected automatically without the driver’s input. 
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Figure 5: Static (left) and dynamic average (right) OBM measurements vs weighbridge 
 
 
A further investigation into the dynamic data involved the analysis of body bounce frequency 
in relation to the mass carried. The body bounce frequency of a vehicle may be measured by 
an OBM system [9]. It is given by the equation: 
f = √(k/m)         Equation 1 
where: 
f = body bounce frequency; 
k = spring rate; and 
m = mass carried by that suspension. 
Therefore, were k a known parameter and f measured from the OBM system, the mass carried 
by that suspension may be derived by solving Equation1. Figure 6 shows the variation of 
body bounce frequency with different loads. It can be seen that the body bounce frequency 
increased as the load decreased. This analysis provided an independent assessment of the 
static mass values reported by the OBM systems. 
 
 
Figure 6: variation of body bounce frequency with different loads 
 
 
Further, a study has been carried out on tamper vs. non-tamper event results and their 
relationship with axle hop frequencies [6].  It was found that axle hop frequencies from all 
tamper tests fell outside certain frequency bands. By this measure and further analysis of 
dynamic data, it may be possible to monitor axle hop parametric thresholds to flag possible 
tampering with OBM measurements. 
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DISCUSSION 
 
Accuracy 
 
All the OBM systems tested produced accuracies within ± 500 kg. It was found that load cell 
based systems were was generally more accurate by 100 – 200 kg per axle group than APT 
systems. In fact, the most fundamental sensors within both types of systems are strain gauges. 
The sensor itself provides same level of accuracy to both systems, further errors introduced 
by APT based systems are attributed to the variations within mechanisms unique to air bag 
suspensions. An air bag suspension may take some minutes to become stable after stopping; 
an OBM reading taken while the air in the suspension is still fluctuating may not capture the 
true load. 
 
 
Vulnerability 
 
Any regulatory application requires a high confidence level in its evidentiary data. Therefore 
the design of an evidentiary OBM system should be tamper evident, acknowledging 
pragmatically that “tamper proof” is improbable or at least, uneconomic. The testing program 
exposed the vulnerability of the commercial OBM systems tested by performing tamper tests. 
 
Shifting load positions on a vehicle did not alter the gross combination mass (GCM) of the 
vehicles but the individual axle group masses did alter during that activity. To observe the 
mass changes on individual axle groups, a mass sensor per axle group was required. Although 
some OBM systems were able to estimate the loads on a steer axle group (without a mass 
sensor on the steer axle), the estimations were only accurate for prime movers. It was found 
that rigid trucks required steer axle sensors to obtain accurate measurements, particularly 
where loads were relocated about the cargo area. 
 
A test was designed to assess the performance of APT based systems against tamper events. 
The test blocked the airlines that connected the airbag suspension and APTs, thus disabling 
the APTs’ ability to measure air pressures in the airbag suspension correctly. This test caused 
the APT based OBM systems to produce incorrect measurements. 
 
Tampering with load cell based systems was achieved by inserting wedges that created extra 
load bearing points.  This redistributed the loads exerted on the load cells. Those tests 
resulted in large underestimations of mass by the load cell based systems. 
 
Other types of tamper tests were also conducted and effects on the OBM systems were found 
to be minor. 
 
 
Tamper detection and sampling frequency 
 
Preliminary analysis of the dynamic OBM results suggested that tampering indicators could 
be developed from the body bounce and/or axle hop frequencies of a vehicle.  
 
To capture body bounce and axle hop frequencies, a minimum sampling frequency of 
primary measurement sensors will be required from OBM systems. On a heavy vehicle, the 
typical body bounce frequency is about 2 Hz.  Axle hop has more complicated mechanisms 
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and is typically above 10 Hz; ranging up to 12 Hz, depending on the HV. To satisfy the 
Nyquist sample rate requirement, a minimum sampling frequency of 24 Hz will therefore be 
required to capture both body bounce and axle hop frequencies. As a result, a minimum 
sampling frequency requirement will be considered for the OBM system specifications within 
the IAP. 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
As part of the development of specifications for regulatory OBM systems, a full scale testing 
program on commercial OBM systems was undertaken from July to October 2008. Twelve 
OBM systems were tested on nine vehicles. The results indicated that all systems were able to 
provide accuracy per axle group to within ± 500 kg vs. weighbridge readings. This accuracy 
was equivalent to ± 2.5% or better on a 20 tonne axle group. Dynamic OBM data was also 
collected and found to be useful as a quality indicator of static measurements.  
 
Overall, load cell based systems were 100 – 200 kg more accurate than APT based systems. 
Tampering with commercial OBM systems was demonstrated to be possible with varyingly 
incorrect results obtained from differing forms of tampering. However, it was found that 
tampering with the OBM systems could be detected through the analysis of dynamic OBM 
data.  
 
TCA is currently proceeding with the development of draft specifications for regulatory 
OBM systems. The draft specifications will be reviewed, trialled and finalised by June 2010. 
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